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106 1 intRoDuction
Sovereign risk has become a pressing issue for the European Union (EU) in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008. At the same time, the 
link between sovereign risk and the banking sectors of EU countries emerged, as 
several EU governments had to intervene to stabilize their banking sectors during 
the severe turmoil of the GFC (Correa et al., 2014). After all, based on the ECB 
Statistical Warehouse data, on average around 9% of total assets of EU banks 
consists of sovereign bonds of EU countries.
The sovereign risk and banking sector nexus in the EU has important implications 
for public finances in EU member states. When governments see banks in their 
countries in need of help, they might decide to prepare a bail-out package to save 
the financial institutions. Such a solution might become a burden on public 
finances: a government must borrow funds and at the same time there is less fiscal 
space for public investments. One outcome is that sovereign risk might increase. 
On the other hand, a bail-out of the banking system can be considered a cost-ef-
fective option if it prevents the economy from collapsing. Arguably, an economic 
collapse would negatively affect public finances to an even greater extent.
Brůha and Kočenda (2018) analyze the potential nexus between sovereign risk and 
the characteristics of banking sectors in the EU, including their quality and perfor-
mance. Their analysis allows general conclusions to be drawn about the whole of 
the EU as well as those specific to regional groups. It also offers potential policy 
implications regarding public finances and public investments in EU countries.
2 bacKGRounD
In general there are three channels linking sovereign risk and banking sectors. 
First, circumstances might require governments to act as lenders of last resort 
when domestic banks are in dire need of recapitalization (Gerlach, Schulz and 
Wolff, 2010). Second, banks’ business operations – and more specifically, their 
adjustments of balance sheets – might have severe implications for the availabil-
ity of short-term funding in a particular country (Adrian and Shin, 2009), for a 
shortage of credit can contribute to higher sovereign risk. Third, Brůha and 
Kočenda (2018) argue for the existence of a corporate credit risk channel. In gen-
eral, higher dynamics of bank credit is inversely related to sovereign risk as it is a 
sign of economic expansion. However, the abundance of the bank credit provided 
might also channel some funding to projects that are destined to fail (Mehrez and 
Kaufmann, 2000). When the inefficiency of such projects materializes, govern-
ments might see their tax revenues declining and unemployment benefits increas-
ing. Firms in charge of failing projects are forced to shrink their workforce and at 
the same time the banks, which have provided the now non-performing loans, are 
supposed to utilize loan loss provisions created in case such situations should 
arise. This development might decrease the fiscal health of a particular country 
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107The existing literature on the sovereign risk and banking sectors nexus in the EU 
is somewhat limited. Gerlach, Schulz and Wolff (2010) report that larger banking 
sectors are associated with higher sovereign risk. Gómez-Puig, Sosvilla-Rivero 
and Singh (2015) find that contagion can spread from banking sectors to sover-
eigns. Brůha and Kočenda (2018) document the existing link between banking 
sector quality and sovereign risk in the whole of the EU over 1999-2014.
Finally, a sizable strand of literature provides an assessment of the link between 
sovereign risk and public finances. For the Eurozone, Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) 
report that public deficits significantly increase risk premia. Bernoth, von Hagen 
and Schuknecht (2012) find evidence that government debt affects yield spreads. 
Using a theoretical model, Corsetti et al. (2013) show that sovereign risk may 
amplify the effects of cyclical shocks to public finances. Finally, for a sample of 
22 advanced economies, Poghosyan (2014) determines that an increase in bond 
yields is positively linked to an increase in the government debt-to-GDP ratio.
Based on the above evidence there are good reasons for the links between sover-
eign risk, banking sector quality, and public investments.
3 Recent eviDence
Brůha and Kočenda (2018) use data on sovereign risk and banking sector charac-
teristics for 27 EU countries in the sample period from 1999 to 2014. They proxy 
sovereign risk with four indicators: (i) the government bond yield spread, (ii) 
sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spread, (iii) expert opinion-based country 
risk score, and (iv) sovereign credit rating. The state of banking sectors in the EU 
countries is characterized by three systemic indicators (size, depth and foreign 
bank penetration) and three indicators related to the performance of banking sec-
tors (efficiency, stability and degree of competition). Their analysis of the sover-
eign risk and banking sector nexus is performed for the whole of the EU along 
with various country groups, for the pre-crisis (1999-2007) and the post-crisis 
(2008-2014) periods. The analysis is based on the Bayesian method for panel data 
with country fixed effects to minimize time-invariant endogeneity (Wooldridge, 
2002; Greene, 2003) to deliver a valid inference under some uncertainty (Daniels 
and Hogan, 2014; Gelman et al., 2014).
Brůha and Kočenda (2018) do find evidence for the link between the efficiency of 
banking sectors and sovereign risk in the EU. They show that less efficient and 
larger banking sectors are linked to higher sovereign risk and the result is robust 
as it holds irrespective of which sovereign risk measure and which country sub-
group is chosen. Other links are specific to a country group or a time period. 
However, higher foreign bank penetration and higher competition – two signs of 
diversified banking sector – are associated with greater financial stability of the 
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108 4 implications
The results of Brůha and Kočenda (2018) suggest certain implications related to 
public investments and public finances in the EU. First, after the GFC, the size of 
banking sectors of the EU countries was started to be perceived by market partici-
pants as an upper bound for potential bailouts. And indeed, several EU countries 
have been forced to conduct them. The finding provides a direct implication for the 
fiscal space of the EU governments. Arguably, a bailout might jeopardize public 
investments as government’s indebtedness increases in the case of a bank rescue.
Second, the link between sovereign risk and banking sector is relevant also from 
the private investment perspective. Investors on stock markets consider countries 
and their banking sectors interconnected, partly, because of the government guar-
antees towards domestic banks (Correa et al., 2014). Moreover, when domestic 
sovereign risk becomes pronounced, foreign creditors first assess the sovereign 
risk and then they consider the creditworthiness of the firms in the economy 
(Cooper and Argyris, 1998). From the side of the banking sector, its lower stabil-
ity implies that fewer funds are available for potential investments.
Finally, the structural break occurring around the onset of the GFC is relevant. The 
results of Brůha and Kočenda (2018) imply that financial markets reassessed the 
linkage between banking sector characteristics and sovereign risk. This yields 
support for the “wake-up call hypothesis” associated with the GFC. The large 
repricing of the sovereign risk after the GFC quite likely affected public invest-
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